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We consider the effects of rent-seeking activities on resource allo-
cation. Before rent-seeking activities take place, there are prior
probabilities that an object will be given to one of several agents.
The posterior probability depends on prior probabilities and the
expenses incurred by all agents. In the case of two agents who
equally value the object, prior and posterior probabilities coincide,
and thus rent seeking has no effect on resource allocation. If
there are two agents with different valuations of the object or we
have more than two agents, rent seeking matters and posterior
probabilities reflect the valuations of the agents.
1. Introduction
Some years ago, it was found that a firm located in southern Europe
engaged in expenditures that may be interpreted as trying to influence
the judges of a famous contest for a prize. A friend of mine ~a native from
the northern country in which the prize is awarded! argued that since all
potential recipients have the opportunity to make the same expenditure,
such activities do not change the outcome of the process and therefore,
prizes given in these circumstances were, after all, fair.
The theory of rent seeking, developed after the seminal paper of
Tullock ~1980!, addresses the question of the characteristics of equilibrium
expenses ~symmetry, rent dissipation, etc.; see Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier
1992 for a characterization of the equilibrium set!. However, to the best of
my knowledge, there has been no analysis of the problem of how rent-
seeking activities distort the decision of who obtains a prize. For instance,
it was found that several cities paid expenses for some members of the
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Olympic Games Committee. The question is: did these expenses change
the odds in favor of one of the contending cities?
In order to investigate this issue, we make several simplifying assump-
tions. We assume that the number of rent-seeker agents is exogenously
given ~see Corcoran 1984 for a model where the number of participants is
a variable!, we assume that information is symmetric, and we disregard all
dynamic aspects of the problem ~see Cairns 1989!. However, our model
generalizes the standard rent-seeking model in several aspects: different
agents may value the object differently and the probability of obtaining
the object is a general function of rent-seeking expenses. We also outline
how illegal lobbying can be considered.
With this model at hand we prove that my friend was right in the case
in which there are two agents with equal valuations of the object to be
allocated ~Propositions 1 and 2, part i!!. When there are more than two
agents or the two agents have different valuations of the object, rent
seeking affects the decision on who receives the prize. In the case of two
agents with different valuations, the posterior probability that the object is
allocated to agent i is larger than the corresponding prior probability if,
and only if, the valuation of i is larger than the valuation of j ~Proposi-
tion 2, part ii!. Under an additional assumption on the form in which
posteriors are formed, in the case of two or more agents, the ranking of
posterior probabilities reflects the ex ante value attached by the agents to
the object ~Proposition 3!. Thus, our results point out that, in certain
cases, there is a positive relation between rent seeking and efficiency, a
point that should be considered when discussing the social desirability of
rent seeking. See Section 4 for further discussion of this point.
The paper ends with an Appendix that discusses the continuity of the
function relating rent-seeking expenses and the probability of obtaining
the object.
2. The Model with Two Agents
Consider the following situation: an object is going to be allocated to one
of two competing agents. Agent i values the object in Vi , i 5 1,2. When the
valuations of both agents are identical we will denote them as V. Before
any rent-seeking activity is undertaken, agents have common prior prob-
abilities that the object will end up in the hands of one of them. Let us
denote this probability qi , i 5 1,2. Prior probabilities are common knowl-
edge. Agents can engage in activities that change these probabilities by
means of expenses Gi , i 5 1,2. The posterior probability that the object
will be allocated to agent i is denoted by pi , i 5 1,2. This probability
depends on prior probabilities and expenses, that is, pi 5 pi ~q ,G !, where




Gj{q jD, i , j 5 1,2. ~1!
2
This corresponds to a much-used specification in the literature on rent-
seeking if priors are identical among agents.
The previous model can deal with a variety of situations, but in this
paper we want to focus our attention on three specific problems:
~1! The Procurement Problem: The object is a contract to provide a
good used by the government ~i.e., a fighter aircraft!. Rent seekers
are the firms supplying the good. A committee takes the decision
on the contract, and the members of the committee receive the
expenses.
~2! Awarding a Prize: The object is a prize. Rent seekers are the
potential recipients. A committee takes the decision on who receives
the prize, and the members of the committee receive the expenses.
~3! Elections: The object is to win office. Rent seekers are the political
parties. Expenses are advertising. Advertising influences the prob-
abilities of winning office.
The previous model is a noncooperative game in which strategies are
expenses and the payoff function for agent i 5 1,2 is expected profit,
that is,
Pi 5 pi ~q ,G1 ,G2 !{Vi 2 Gi .
Since q and Vi are fixed, the payoff of i can be written as Pi ~G1,G2!,
i 5 1,2.
A Nash equilibrium of the above game is a pair ~G1* ,G2* ! so that Gi*
maximizes Pi ~Gi ,Gj* !, i , j 5 1,2. Since our interest is to analyze the effects
of rent seeking we will consider only equilibria in which all agents make
positive expenses ~we note that asymmetric equilibria with some Gi* 5 0
may exist, see Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier 1992, p. 342!.
Let pi* 5 pi ~q ,G1* ,G2* !.
Computing the Nash equilibrium of this game for the specific pi ~ !
function given in equation ~1! above, assuming that V1 5 V2, we find that
G1* 5 G2* 5 q1 q2V and pi* 5 qi , i 5 1,2.
This is interesting on two counts. First, the Nash equilibrium is sym-
metric in spite of the fact that payoff functions are possibly different
~since q1 and q2 are not necessarily identical!. Second, in this case, rent
seeking does not distort resource allocation since posterior probabilities
equal prior probabilities. In terms of the examples spelled out above,
expenses do not influence who gets the contract0prize or which party
wins office. In the rest of this paper we will investigate if this is a general
result or not, and in the latter case, what the proper generalization is.
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Even though the focus of this paper is not on the existence of a Nash
equilibrium, we will first show that if V1 5 V2 there is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. In order to do that we need the following assumptions on
p1~ !:
~a! p1~ ! is continuously differentiable in G1 and G2 for strictly posi-
tive values of these variables.
~b! p1~ ! is concave on G1 and convex on G2.
~c! p1~ ! is homogeneous of degree zero on G1 and G2.
~d! dp1~q , y , y !0dG1 goes to zero when y goes to infinity, and it goes to
a number greater than 10V when y goes to zero.
~e! p1~q ,G1,G2! . q1 if and only if G1 . G2.
Assumptions ~a! and ~d! are merely technical. Assumption ~b! implies
that the payoff of agent i is concave on Gi , i 5 1,2, which is a standard
condition in game theory. Assumption ~c! says that units in which expenses
are measured do not affect p1. This assumption creates a technical diffi-
culty that is discussed in the Appendix. Assumption ~e! says that the only
way to increase the posterior probability beyond the prior probability is by
making larger expenses than those made by the other firm. Assumptions
~a! and ~e! imply that p1~q , z , z ! 5 q1 for any z . 0, that is, when both
agents make equal expenses, prior and posterior probabilities are identi-
cal. The class of functions satisfying ~a!–~e! is not empty; see, for example,
~1! above. A more general class of functions is the one given by
P1 5 G1a f1~q1!YS(
j51
2
Gja fj ~q j !D, 0 , a ≤ 1, ~1a!
where the functions fj ~ ! satisfy q1 5 f1~q1!0~(j512 fj ~q j !!. Another class of
functions satisfying ~a ! to ~e ! is
P1 5 G1a f1~q1!YS(
j51
2
Gj fj ~q j !Da, 0 , a ≤ 1, ~1b!
with the same restriction on the functions fj ~ !.
PROPOSITION 1: Under ~a!–~d ! above if V1 5 V2, there is a Nash equilibrium
with G1* 5 G2* . If ~e! also holds, pi* 5 qi , i 5 1,2.
Proof: Let x * be a solution of the equation
dp1~q , x , x !0dG1 5 10V.
The existence of x * is guaranteed by ~a! and ~d!. Then,
V{dp1~q , x *, x * !0dG1 2 15 0,
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which is the first order condition for maximization of P1~ ! with
respect to G1. Since P1~ ! is concave on G1, this implies that x
*
maximizes P1~G1, x
* ! with respect to G1. Now, from ~c!
x *{dp1~q , x *, x * !0dG1 1 x *{dp1~q , x *, x * !0dG2 5 0,
which, since x * . 0, implies that
dp1~q , x *, x * !0dG1 5 2dp1~q , x *, x * !0dG2 .
Thus,
2V{dp1~q , x *, x * !0dG2 5 1.
Since p1~ ! is convex on G2 , x
* maximizes
~1 2 p1~q , x *,G2 !!{V 2 G2 5 P2 ~G2 , x * !
with respect to G2. Thus G1 5 G2 5 x
* is a Nash equilibrium, and by
~a! and ~e! pi* 5 qi , i 5 1,2. n
The next proposition provides a converse to Proposition 1 and also
deals with the case in which the Vi s are not identical.
PROPOSITION 2: At any interior Nash equilibrium:
~i! Under ~a! and ~c!, G1* 5 G2* if and only if V1 5 V2. If ~e! also holds,
pi* 5 qi , i 5 1,2, if and only if V1 5 V2.
~ii! Under ~a! and ~c!, G1* . G2* if and only if V1 . V2. If ~e! also holds,
p1* . q1 if and only if V1 . V2.
Proof: From the first order conditions of a Nash equilibrium,
V1{dp1~q ,G1* ,G2* !0dG1 2 1 5 0 5 2V2{dp1~q ,G1* ,G2* !0dG2 2 1.
From ~c! we have that
G1*{dp1~q ,G1* ,G2* !0dG1 1 G2*{dp1~q ,G1* ,G2* !0dG2 5 0.
From the first order conditions of a Nash equilibrium it follows that
dp1~q ,G1* ,G2* !0dG1 . 0. Thus, from the last two equations we find that
G1*0G2* 5 V1 0V2 . Thus, G1
* . ~resp. 5! G2* if and only if V1 . ~resp. 5!
V2. Finally, p1
* . ~resp. 5! q1 if and only if V1 . ~resp. 5! V2 follows
from ~e!. n
If V1 5 V2, all firms would be better off if rent seeking were effectively
banished since they incur expenditures just to maintain the probability of
getting the object. However, if V1 is much greater than V2, firm 1 may be
better off under rent seeking than under no rent seeking. For instance, in
the case in which the functional form ~1! holds, the expected profits of
firm 1 in the Nash equilibrium are q12{V130~(j512 Vj{q j ! 2. Since expected
profits under no rent seeking are q1{V1, it is easily calculated that the
former are greater than the latter if and only if V1 . V2{~1 1 ~10q1!
102 !.
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Propositions 1 and 2 can be worked out with similar conclusions in
the case in which lobbying is illegal. In this case, if the lobbying activity of
agent i is exposed, this agent is fined with a quantity Fi that depends on
Gi , that is, Fi 5 F ~Gi !. Let ri be the probability that the lobbying is
discovered. This probability is a function of Gi , that is, ri 5 r ~Gi !. Let Li 5
r ~Gi !{F ~Gi ! 5 L~Gi ! be the expected loss of i if her lobbying activities are
exposed. Expected payoffs of i are
Pi ~Gi ,Gj !{r ~Gi ! 1 Pi ~Gi ,Gj !{~1 2 r ~Gi !! 2 L~Gi ! 5 Pi ~Gi ,Gj ! 2 L~Gi !.
Propositions 1 and 2 can be proved by adapting Assumptions ~a!–~e! and
assuming that Li ~ ! is differentiable and convex.
3. The Model with an Arbitrary Number of Agents
In the case of more than two agents, Propositions 1 and 2 no longer hold.
For instance, consider the generalization of the functional form given by




Gj{q jD, i , j 5 1, . . . , n . ~19!
We find that the Nash equilibrium of the game with n agents with iden-
tical valuations is1




In general, pi* and qi will be different ~they are equal if priors are iden-
tical!. For instance, if q 5 ~0’375, 0’375, 0’25! we find that p * 5 ~0’43, 0’43,
0’14!. However, under ~1’ !, it is easily seen that pi* . ~resp. 5! pj* if and
only if qi . ~resp. 5! q j . In other words, rent-seeking expenses do not
change the ranking of probabilities. We will show that a generalization of
this property holds when agents have different valuations and probability
functions are of the following form:
pi 5 p ~Gi{qi ,C~G1{q1 ,G2{q2 , . . . ,Gn{qn !!, i 5 1, . . . , n . ~2!
Let x [ Gi{qi and z [ C~G1{q1,G2{q2 , . . . ,Gn{qn!. Then,
]pi 0]Gi 5 qi ~]p0]x 1 ]p0]z{]C0]x !.
Let us write the right hand side of the above equation as
qi{F ~Gi{qi ,C~G1{q1 ,G2{q2 , . . . ,Gn{qn !! [ qi{F ~Gi{qi , z !.
1We assume that qi ≥ ~n 2 2!0(jÞi 10q j , i 5 1, . . . , n . This assumption holds if a priori
probabilities do not differ too much from each other.
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Now, we assume the following:
~f ! F ~ ! is decreasing on Gi , given z , and p ~ ! is increasing on Gi ,
given z .
An example of a functional form like ~2! satisfying ~f ! is the following
~which generalizes ~1’ ! above!:
pi 5 f ~Gi{qi !Y(
j51
n
f ~Gj{q j !, i , j 5 1, . . . , n ,
where f ~ ! is strictly increasing, differentiable, and concave with non-
negative values. Taking z [ (j51n f ~Gj{q j !, it is clear that pi 5 f ~Gi{qi !0z ,
and thus pi ~ ! is increasing on Gi , given z . Also,






5 Vi qi{f ’~Gi{qi !{~z 2 f ~Gi{qi !0~z !2
~derivatives are denoted by primes!. Thus, under the above conditions on
f ~ !, F ~ ! is decreasing on Gi , given z .
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that ~2! and ~ f ! hold. Then, for any i and k with
Gi* . 0 and Gk* . 0,
~i! pi* 5 pk* if and only if Vi{qi 5 Vk{qk .
~ii! pi* . pk* if and only if Vi{qi . Vk{qk .
Proof: Consider the first order condition of payoff maximization for i :
Vi{]pi 0]Gi 2 1 5 0.
Or equivalently,
Vi{qi{F ~Gi*{qi ,C~G1*{q1 ,G2*{q2 , . . . ,Gn *{qn !! 2 1 5 0.
Also, for agent k ,
Vk{qk{F ~Gk*{qk ,C~G1*{q1 ,G2*{q2 , . . . ,Gn*{qn !!, 2 1 5 0.
From the last two equations, it follows that
Vi{qi{F ~Gi*{qi ,C~G1*{q1 ,G2*{q2 , . . . ,Gn*{qn !!
Vk{qk{F ~Gk*{qk ,C~G1*{q1 ,G2*{q2 , . . . ,Gn*{qn !!.
Clearly, if Vi{qi 5 Vk{qk ,Gi
*{qi 5 Gk*{qk , and thus pi* 5 pk* . Conversely,
if pi* 5 pk* , ~2! implies that Gi*{qi 5 Gk*{qk and the above equations
imply that Vi{qi 5 Vk{qk .
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Suppose now that Vi{qi . Vk{qk . Thus
F ~Gi*{qi ,C~G1*{q1 ,G2 *{q2 , . . . ,Gn*{qn !!
, F ~Gk*{qk ,C~G1*{q1 ,G2*{q2 , . . . ,Gn*{qn !!,
and Gi*{qi . Gk*{qk follows from F ~ ! decreasing on Gi* . Thus, pi* . pk* .
Finally, suppose that pi* . pk* . Then, ~2! implies that Gi*{qi .
Gk*{qk . Plugging this inequality into the first order conditions of pay-
off maximization,
Vi{qi{F ~Gi*{qi ,C~G1*{q1 ,G2 *{q2 , . . . ,Gn*{qn !!
5 Vk{qk{F ~Gk*{qk ,C~G1*{q1 ,G2*{q2 , . . . ,Gn*{qn !!
, Vk{qk{F ~Gi*{qi ,C~G1*{q1 ,G2*{q2 , . . . ,Gn*{qn !!,
which implies that Vi{qi . Vk{qk . n
Notice that Proposition 3 also holds in the case of two agents.
4. Discussion of Results
In this paper we have identified a case in which rent-seeking activities do
not matter in terms of resource allocation: two agents with identical val-
uation of the object. When there are more agents, or two agents value the
object differently, rent seeking makes a difference. In the first case, pos-
terior probabilities reflect a priori expected valuations, that is, pi* ≥ pk* if
and only if Vi qi ≥ Vkqk . In the second case, the increase in posterior
probabilities with respect to priors reflect valuations, that is, V1 . V2 if and
only if p1* . q1. In both cases, rent-seeking activities increase the chance
that the agents who value the object most ~in real or in expected terms!
get the object. The interpretation of this fact in the three examples spelled
out above is, however, very different. In the procurement problem we may
say that rent seeking is socially beneficial because it makes the allocation
of the object more efficient.2 In the case of the prize, rent seeking makes
it more likely that candidates with high valuations ~not necessarily the
best! win the prize. Finally, in the case of political competition, advertise-
ment favors parties with very high valuation for office, that is, either
corrupt or very patriotic political parties.3
2The notion of efficiency ~ex ante or ex post! used here depends on whether we refer to
Proposition 2 ~ex post! or to Proposition 3 ~ex ante!.
3 In this discussion we have neglected the negative effects ~on, say, public morality! of the
transfers of money between candidates and committee members.
8
Appendix: Discussion of the Function pi ~ !.
The assumption that the function pi ~ ! is homogeneous of degree zero
creates a difficulty: if pi ~ ! is continuous at zero expenses by both firms,
pi ~ ! must be constant on G1 0G2. Indeed, fix any G1 0G2. Take a sequence
of G1 and G2 where both tend to zero but the ratio remains constant. By
homogeneity of degree zero the value of the function pi ~ ! remains con-
stant in the sequence and by continuity this value, say, a , must be the
value of the function in the limit. Consider now other G1 0G2 and take a
sequence with the same properties as the one before. By the same argu-
ment, the value of the function in the sequence must be the value in the
limit, and this must be a . Thus the function is constant on G1 0G2. Since
this is absurd, we must admit that the function pi ~ ! is either discontinu-
ous or undefined on ~0, 0!. The latter occurs in the case where
pi 5 Gi{qi 0~(j Gj{q j !, i , j 5 1,2 ~equation ~1! in the text!. It is clear that
the function above can be redefined to take an arbitrary value, say, qi ,
when G1 5 G2 5 0.
The fact that the probability function pi ~ ! is discontinuous at ~0, 0!
says that a little rent seeking does indeed make a difference when com-
pared with the situation where there is no rent seeking–an intriguing fact.
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